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Wallace Timmeny* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1 (FCPA) really started 
with Watergate. The Special Prosecutor had investigated a 
number of illegal campaign contributions by American corpora-
tions.2 The role of the prosecutor, however, was limited to deter-
mining whether the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 602 of the Federal 
Criminal Code had been violated by these contributions. We at the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) were watching the 
Special Prosecutor, and were intrigued by the devices the corpo-
rate community had used to get the funds for the contributions 
out of the corporate arena, away from corporate books. To satisfy 
our curiosity, we filed motions to obtain Grand Jury transcripts of 
the Prosecutor's investigations. After obtaining some of these 
Grand Jury transcripts, the first thing we found was that these 
large contributions were coming from slush funds that were main-
tained off the books of the various corporations. It seemed that 
one of the principal devices for setting up the slush funds was pay-
ment through a foreign agent or a consultant who would, in turn, 
return the money to the corporation, allowing the corporation to 
set up an off-the-book fund. We also learned that only a very small 
part of the money that was going into these funds was coming 
back for campaign contributions. The rest, it seemed, was remain-
ing in the hands of the agents and was being used for what we 
eventually called "questionable payments," or in some cases actual 
bribes, in order to obtain and retain business overseas. 
Having seen this as the problem, the enforcement staff of the 
SEC tried to determine just what it was that this meant to the 
public investor, the shareholder in a public company. We came up 
with a number of theories that we thought would have to be em-
• Former Deputy Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC. Presently a partner of 
Kutak, Rock and Huie, Washington, D.C. 
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 102-104, 91 Stat. 
1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-l, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. V 1981)), reprinted in Ap-
pendix I, infra. 
2. See Foreign and Corrupt Bribes: Hearings on S. 3133, Before the Senate Commit-
tee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976). 
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ployed in analyzing this problem. The first theory was that the in-
vestor had a right to know if the company's books were being tam-
pered with; it seemed clear, we thought, that the investor had a 
right to know that there was a possibility of a dishonest account-
ing. We also thought that an investor had a right to know if man-
agement was using his money to violate either U.S. or foreign 
laws. We also believed that an investor had the right to know 
when and how management was obtaining significant lines of busi-
ness thr<;mgh bribery, or was subjecting the company to risks of 
losing significant lines of business if the bribery activities of the 
company were discovered. Finally, we believed an investor had a 
right to know of management stewardship of corporate assets if 
that stewardship involved the outlay of millions of dollars to con-
sultants with no accountability for the consultants' use of the 
funds. 
We did not, however, make moral judgments about the corpo-
rations and what they were doing. We tried to separate morality 
and the law- a difficult task. We did not make a determination 
that a corporation was good or bad. We felt only that we were en-
forcing the applicable provisions of the federal securities laws. If 
an overseas activity resulted in a possible loss of business, or if it 
indicated that the corporation was not making an honest account-
ing to its shareholders, then we made a determination as to 
whether that activity was material to the shareholders. If we 
thought that it was material, we recommended an enforcement ac-
tion. 
In the early days when we were drafting some of the com-
plaints in the first cases, the seeds were planted for the FCP A as 
we now know it. For example, the first thing we did when we 
drafted our complaints in these cases was to seek an injunction 
against the falsification of books and records. At that time there 
was no requirement that companies maintain accurate books and 
records, but we sought injunctions against false entries.3 That was 
the seed for section 13(b)(2)(a) of the Exchange Act.4 
In addition, we also drafted some language concerning inter-
nal controls in the early pleadings. This arose from an incident 
that occurred when we confronted a company that had entered on 
its books enormous payments to foreign agents and consultants, in 
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A). 
4. Id. 
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contrast to those companies that paid agents through off-the-
books slush funds. The company argued that it could not be charged 
with preparing false books and records, although it conceded it did 
not know how the agents and consultants had used the payments. 
In response to this, I suggested that we charge the company with 
failing to disclose that payments were made to consultants and 
agents without adequate records and controls to ensure that the 
services performed by the agents, if any, were commensurate 
with the amounts paid. That was the seed for the internal controls 
provisions for the FCPA.5 And later, as part of the FCPA, the idea 
became a more vigorous and refined legal concept. 
It is important to mention that, at the same time, the SEC 
was very concerned about the magnitude of the problem. It ap-
peared to be impossible to handle all of these apparently question-
able payments as enforcement cases; there was a serious question 
as to whether the SEC could bring enforcement cases in every in-
stance. The commission did not want to continue exclusively along 
the enforcement tack, so they came up with what was called the 
voluntary program:6 if a company were to do its own investigation 
and come in and discuss disclosure and stop doing whatever they 
were doing, there might be less necessity to bring an enforcement 
case. It was not an immunity program, but it was a mechanism to 
separate the big problems from the little problems. About 400 
companies came in and disclosed that they had had problems. 
Without getting into all the details of the so-called voluntary 
program, it was clear that the problem was of such magnitude that 
something else had to be done. That is when the Congress came into 
the picture.7 Two Congressmen in particular were interested in 
what was going on, Senator Church and Senator Proxmire. Both 
decided that more had to be done because the enforcement ap-
proach was not sufficiently prophylactic. They vigorously urged 
the Justice Department to get involved and to bring a number of 
criminal cases, and Senator Proxmire began to think in terms of a 
statute that would preclude foreign payments. 
At the same time, there were the foreign policy concerns. One 
American company had allegedly paid bribes in excess of forty 
5. Section 102 of the FCPA requires that issuers "devise and maintain a system of in-
ternal accounting controls." 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). 
6. See Stevenson, The SEC and the New Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 50 (1976). 
7. Surrey, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 
20 HARV. INT'L L .J. 293, 295 (1979). 
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million dollars in Italy. In fact, the Italian government nearly col-
lapsed as a result of the activities of American companies. 
Another company had allegedly enaged in conduct in Japan that re-
sulted in the Japanese government toppling. There were also the 
scandals in the Netherlands where Prince Bernhard was allegedly 
on the payroll of an American company. Concerns were expressed 
that our government was faced with foreign policy determinations 
or decisions being made by American corporations. In other 
words, some of our corporations were affecting foreign policy and 
there was also the overriding concern that the whole idea of 
foreign payments or corruption in business was really putting an 
arrow in the bow of the countries that oppose our system. It gave 
other countries the opportunity to argue that our system is based 
on corruption. Finally, there was a concern that U.S. business 
did not know what was good for itself, and to continue along these 
lines, relying on bribery, was not in the best interest of U.S. 
business. We had to develop the strength to compete based on 
quality of product and not on our ability to make a payment in a 
black bag.8 
At the time Congress became very active, the SEC was sort 
of a reluctant dragon. The Commission thought that it had the 
authority to adopt rules or to bring enforcement action, so as not 
to have to seek a statute that actually prohibited foreign 
payments. When the Commission saw that there would be a 
FCPA, however, it sought a very strong statute. 
The Ford Administration at the time took an approach to the 
statute that has variously been described as cool, lukewarm, and 
tepid. The Ford Administration did not vigorously seek a statute 
that prohibited foreign payments, but rather, advocated a statute 
that would only require disclosure of a company's foreign 
payments. The company would make the disclosure with the Com-
merce Department, the Interior Department or any Department 
except the Justice Department or the SEC. At that time, in the at-
mosphere carried over from Watergate, a mild dose of disclosure 
was not hailed as a measure likely to produce a lasting cure. What 
came out of the legislative process was the FCP A as we now know 
it.9 
8. See George & Dundas, Responsibilities of Domestic Corporate Management 
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 865, 868 n. 9 (1980). 
9. See note 1 supra. 
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II. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
A. Provisions 
The Act as adopted had antibribery provisions 10 and account-
ing provisions. 11 On the antibribery side, the FCP A first, through 
section 103, added a new section 30A to the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934. That section and its prohibition applied to issuers, that 
is, companies that are public companies who file reports with the 
SEC.12 Also, section 104 adopted antibribery provisions and pro-
hibitions that extended to what were known as domestic 
concerns.13 Domestic concerns were defined in the Act as anything 
other than reporting companies. A partnership, a Massachusetts 
trust, or an individual, for example, could be a domestic concern. 
Section 104 extended the same prohibitions as section 103 to 
domestic concerns. 
The issuers and the domestic concerns were prohibited from 
making, authorizing or promising payments or gifts of anything of 
value to a foreign official, party or party official or candidate, or to 
any person that the issuer or the domestic concern knew or had 
reason to know would pass along the money to a foreign official or 
to a political party or to a member of a political party. Thus, there 
were prohibitions on payments to officials, political parties, and 
third persons, with reason to know that the payments will be pass-
ed along. The prohibitions went to the making of payments to in-
fluence a government official in some official act or to induce him 
to use his influence with his government to obtain or retain 
business, or to direct business for the company making the pay-
ment. There is no de minimus standard in the statute; it applies to 
anything of value. 14 
Note that a facilitating payment to move goods or to get an 
import license, or something that the company is entitled to in a 
country, was not prohibited. That was done not by specifying that 
those payments were allowed, but by defining a foreign official to 
exclude a ministerial official, or low level employee in an agency .15 
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (Supp. V 1981). 
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (Supp. V 1981). 
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (Supp. V 1981). 
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(l) (Supp. V 1981). 
14. See Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities and International Finance 
and Monetary Policy of the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 84-6 (1981). 
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(d)(2) (Supp. V 1981). 
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That a payment had to be made to obtain or retain business, or be 
directed to someone for those purposes, is an important concept 
because the argument can be made that payments to get tax legis-
lation or some sort of a regulatory benefit in a country might not 
be included within the provisions of the statute. 
Still another point to note is that jurisdictional means had to 
be used in order to violate the statute. The jurisdictional means, 
such as the mails or other instrumentality, need only be used in 
furtherance of the payment, not the actual making of payment. If 
one were to use the jurisdictional means to cover up payment or to 
send a message to get to the point where one was going to make 
an improper payment, that could well be in furtherance of the pay-
ment. 
The accounting provisions apply only to companies whose 
securities are registered under the 1934 Act. The first accounting 
provision under section 104 of the FCP A put a new section 13(b)(2) 
into the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This section has a provi-
sion that all issuers have to make and keep books and records and 
accounts, which in reasonable detail reflect transactions and dispo-
sitions of the assets of the issuer. The FCP A also added section 
13(b)(2)(B) to the 1934 Act, a section which deals with internal con-
trols. The provision requires that all issuers have to devise and 
maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to pro-
vide reasonable assurances that transactions are executed in ac-
cordance with management's authorization; that transactions are 
recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of financial state-
ments and to maintain accountability for assets; that access to 
assets is permitted only in accordance with management authori-
zation; and that recorded accountability is compared to existing 
assets at reasonable intervals, with appropriate steps taken to cor-
rect any differences. 
The internal control provisions, 16 therefore, are designed to 
deal with the problems of off-the-books slush funds or company 
employees going beyond company policy and using corporate 
assets to make payments, or whatever, in a way the management 
would not want them used. They were also designed to ensure 
that there are controls on the company assets- that a company 
knows what assets it has and that management is aware of what is 
going on within a company concerning its assets. After the statute 
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1981). 
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was adopted and signed into law, the SEC adopted rules to further 
the purposes of the FCP A.17 One rule adopted by the SEC pro-
hibits the falsification of the books and records that are required 
to be kept under the FCP A. The other rule adopted by the Com-
mission prohibits an officer or director from making a materially 
false or misleading statement or omitting to state a material fact 
to accountants or auditors in connection with audits or filings. 
B. Enforcement Responsibilities 
An important feature of the statute is that it is administered 
dually by the Justice Department and by the SEC. The SEC has 
civil enforcement responsibility for the accounting provisions, and 
the Justice Department has criminal enforcement responsibilities 
for the accounting provisions. The SEC has civil enforcement re-
sponsibility for the antibribery provisions that apply to issuers.18 
The Justice Department has civil enforcement responsibilities 
with respect to the antibribery provisions that apply to domestic 
concerns, and criminal responsibility with respect to antibribery 
provisions that apply to issuers and domestic concerns.19 Thus, ad-
ministration was carefully thought out to give the SEC responsi-
bility for issuers who file reports with the SEC, and the Justice 
Department responsibility for the domestic concerns that do not 
file with the SEC. The FCP A maintains a traditional approach, as 
the SEC has no criminal authority in any arena and can only in-
vestigate and refer criminal matters to the Department of Justice. 
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In the four years since the FCP A has been in effect, there has 
been a great rush to shore up internal controls. There has been a 
great debate about what is meant by some of the terms in the sta-
tute, such as what is meant by "reasonable detail" with respect to 
keeping books and records, or what is meant by "reasonable assur-
ances" with respect to internal controls requirements.20 A commit-
tee of the American Bar Association put out a guide with respect to 
the accounting provisions, stating, in general, that if the question-
able conduct does not impact upon financial statements, then it is 
17. Rule 13(b)(l)-(2), 44 FED. REG. 10, codified in 17 C.F .R. § 240.13(b)2-1 (1982). 
18. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1978). 
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976). 
20. See supra note 15. 
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beyond the reach of the accounting provisons.21 The staff of the 
SEC countered with the argument that Congress intended the ac-
counting provisions not to apply narrowly to financial statement 
preparation, but rather to apply broadly to bolster or rehabilitate 
corporate accountability in light of the questionable payments 
scandals. The result of the differing ABA and SEC staff views has 
been a shooting match that has flared up on and off for years at 
seminars and ABA meetings. 
With the antibribery provisions, the difficulty has become the 
problem of dealing with agents overseas. The provision states that 
a payment to a third party, with knowledge or with reason to 
know that the third party is going to pass the money on to a 
foreign official, is illegal. The problem arises with the definition of 
"reason to know." That is a concept that is going to be applied 
with hindsight. Many companies groped for safeguards that would 
withstand investigation at some later stage. Procedures have been 
developed over the years to try and help people who have to deal 
with the "reason to know" provision. For example, lawyers recom-
mend that companies use a certain amount of diligence to investi-
gate the qualifications and background of an agent, to outline his 
duties, and to set up a mechanism to monitor his activities. In 
essence, companies have been advised to record and document 
their efforts to demonstrate that they have operated in good faith. 
Good faith is the antithesis of corruption, thus, when a company 
documents its efforts to determine who the agents were and so 
forth, it establishes good faith and cuts against the argument that 
anything might have been done corruptly. There are obviously 
problems where foreign government officials double as business-
men and that conduct is not prohibited in their countries. Though 
such problems can be dealt with, it is sometimes difficult. 
The Justice Department, with respect to the FCP A, has a re-
view procedure through which a company can seek to get some 
assistance, and can determine whether or not the Justice Depart-
ment will prosecute on a given set of facts. The Justice Depart-
ment stated that it would not prosecute a company where a gov-
ernment official who represented a company, and at the same time 
had an official function with respect to the company's activities, 
21. ABA Comm. on Corp. Law and Accounting, A Guide to the New Section 13(b)(2) 
Accounting Requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 34 Bus. LA w. 307 (1978). 
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isolated himself from any official decision affecting his client com-
pany. The Department, however, has stated that its position is not 
to be viewed as a precedent. 
In any event, the tougher problems come along when there is 
sufficient time to utilize the review procedure, such as the last 
minute demand from a government official to a company to pay a 
commission of X percent to an agent new to the transaction. The 
company, faced with complying with the demand or the loss of 
business, has a serious problem under the statute. It has been my 
experience that the business community in this country recog-
nizes the problem and aborts transactions like that. The company 
will usually walk away even though it may be at a substantial cost 
to their shareholders. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In general, as a result of ambiguities in the books and records 
provisions, and the very rigorous antibribery provisions, the cry 
has gone out that the statute is destroying our ability to compete 
overseas, and has destroyed or decreased our exports. There is 
also a complaint that aids, such as the Justice Department review 
procedure, are too little, too late. Companies do not want to be-
come laboratory experiments for determining how some of the 
terms are going to be interpreted. Finally, there is a complaint 
that the costs of compliance are so great, and the burden so great 
that foreign transactions are just not worth the effort, so they are 
aborted. There has been a great deal of evidence from Senate 
hearings on potential amendments of the FCP A, that the Act is 
difficult to live with. 
The cries about ambiguity or the potential for uneven en-
forcement are seriously overdone. In my view, the enforcement 
record of the SEC and the Justice Department has been extremely 
modest. In the four years since the FCP A has been passed, only a 
handful of cases have been prosecuted. Cases brought under the 
accounting provisions of the FCP A have been very straightfor-
ward. For example, officials of a company had collected the pro-
ceeds of a public offering and used them for personal purposes. 
The SEC brought an action, maintaining the company violated the 
internal controls provisions and the books and records provisions 
of the FCP A. In another case, officers of a public company had 
allegedly paid themselves a travel expense every day, for a two 
year period, during which they actually spent a lot of time at 
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home. So the Commission brought a case charging violation of the 
accounting provisons. In another case, the Commission was con-
cerned that a public company was not making its filings under the 
1934 Act, and so sent out staff to find out why. The staff found 
that the company did not have any books and records, so it could 
not make any reports. The Commission brought charges of viola-
tions of the accounting provisions. 
These are not examples of earthshaking cases or cases involv-
ing difficult interpretive issues.22 As to the antibribery provisions, 
no more than four or five cases have been brought in four years. 
Thus, the enforcement of the FCP A has not been extreme. In any 
event, there is a strong movement to amend the statute. There are 
ambiguities in the FCPA; we now have experience with it, and it 
can stand amendment. This amendment process is under way now. 
22. See generally Timmeny, International Aspects of the Accounting Provisions of 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 360 CORP. L. & PRAC. 53 (1981). 
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